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FOREWORD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF 
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN  
J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO 
Allan Ides* 
        It is emphatically the duty of the U.S. Supreme Court to say what 
the law is. The constitutional law of personal jurisdiction is entirely 
judge-made and, therefore, Court decisions have serious consequences 
for those who seek redress for their injuries. In the October 2010 term, 
when the Court granted certiorari in the products-liability case 
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, it was poised to ameliorate a 
state of confusion surrounding the personal jurisdiction “stream-of-
commerce” doctrine. Since 1987, lower courts, litigants, and scholars 
have struggled to apply the conflicting personal jurisdiction standards 
that the Court announced in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v Superior 
Court. Some courts have applied the “pure” stream-of-commerce 
standard that Justice Brennan championed in Asahi, while others have 
required litigants to meet Justice O’Connor’s more stringent “plus” 
stream-of-commerce model. 
        This Foreword explains how those who look to the J. McIntyre 
opinion to clarify the law of personal jurisdiction in products liability 
cases—and to fulfill the Court’s responsibility to attend well to 
constitutional doctrines—will be sorely disappointed. First, this 
Foreword criticizes Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion for its flawed 
interpretation of precedent, for its conclusory legal analysis, and for 
failing to clarify the doctrinal standards. Then, this Foreword laments 
how Justice Breyer’s concurrence manipulates the facts of the case to 
fit his fabrication of the applicable doctrine. Finally, this Foreword 
shows how Justice Ginsburg’s dissent focuses on the narrative while it 
fails to address the central question in J. McIntyre; thus, it plays an 
active role in the Court’s giant leap backward. With each opinion so 
 
 * Christopher N. May Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Many thanks to 
Chris May, who read and commented on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to Elena 
DeCoste Grieco for her careful and precise editing. 
  
342 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:341 
lacking in care and judgment, lower courts will continue to muddle 
through the questions left open in Asahi, questions now burdened with 
the unhelpful J. McIntyre overlay. In the judiciary’s role to say what the 
law is, the U.S. Supreme Court in J. McIntyre let us all down. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”1 From this firmly established 
proposition, it follows that the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations 
of the Constitution are the supreme law of the land.2 The 
consequences of that principle are particularly profound when the 
Constitution’s text speaks in sweeping terms, as does the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for such broadly 
worded texts invite a level and form of judicial activity that 
inseparably blends the roles of lawmaker and law interpreter. The 
constitutional law of personal jurisdiction presents a case in point, 
because 100 percent of that law is judge-made and therefore subject 
to the Supreme Court’s unchecked authority. 
The Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations matter. They 
not only determine the winners and losers in the cases to which they 
apply but they also channel government policy into currents that flow 
from Court-established doctrine. The decisions often touch on issues 
that enflame public debate and may even go so far as to select the 
next President of the United States.3 And while the constitutional law 
of personal jurisdiction may not be headline-grabbing—at least not 
for all of us—the doctrine developed under that rubric has serious 
consequences for those seeking redress for injuries suffered and for 
everyone participating in our market-driven economy as a producer, 
seller, or consumer of goods. It is, therefore, fitting to demand that 
the High Court, as the unchecked maker of the constitutional law of 
personal jurisdiction, attend well to the doctrines that it fabricates, 
for as our friendly neighborhood Spider-Man reminds us, “With 
great power comes great responsibility.”4 
This Foreword focuses on a particular decision by the Supreme 
Court during its October 2010 term: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro.5 At issue in that case was whether New Jersey courts could 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer of 
 
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 2. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 3. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 4. SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002). Yes, I know, Spidey’s Uncle Ben says it first. 
 5. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
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industrial machines, one of whose machines was sold in New Jersey, 
where it allegedly injured an employee who was using it in the 
normal course of business.6 The jurisdictional issue revolved around 
the “stream-of-commerce” doctrine.7 U.S. courts have used that 
doctrine for several decades as a basis for justifying the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in products liability suits brought against out-of-
state manufacturers whose products are sold in the forum state and 
cause injury there.8 The law in this critical area, however, has been in 
a state of confusion for many years. In 2010, the Supreme Court 
stepped in and granted certiorari in J. McIntyre, ostensibly to 
ameliorate that confusion. 
The Court heard oral argument in J. McIntyre on January 11, 
2011, and announced its judgment 167 days later, on the closing day 
of the term.9 The relatively lengthy delay between argument and 
decision was a sign that the Court had struggled with the decision. 
The sign was correct. The J. McIntyre Court issued no majority 
opinion, and the three opinions that it did issue (a plurality, a 
concurrence, and a dissent)10 exacerbated rather than ameliorated the 
doctrinal confusion. Moreover, each of the opinions, to varying 
degrees, demonstrated a disappointing level of judicial competence 
well below that which we can rightfully expect from Supreme Court 
Justices. I will save the details of my critique for later. At this point, 
suffice it to say that the separate opinions showed an individual and a 
collective lack of judgment, as well as a troubling willingness to 
dispose of an important case in a haphazard and indeterminate 
fashion. We should expect and demand much more from these 
exalted, life-tenured jurists. 
Part II of this Foreword describes the facts of the case. Part III 
provides a brief survey of the relevant doctrinal landscape, focusing 
particularly on the status of the stream-of-commerce doctrine as it 
stood prior to the grant of certiorari in J. McIntyre. Part IV 
summarizes the decisions of the lower courts in this case. Part V 
examines and criticizes the J. McIntyre plurality, concurring, and 
 
 6. Id. at 2786. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961). 
 9. 131 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 10. Id. at 2785 (plurality opinion); id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
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dissenting opinions for their lack of craftsmanship, integrity, and 
judgment. Part VI offers a few concluding remarks regarding the 
minimal standards of professionalism that ought to guide the 
Supreme Court and shape every opinion that a Supreme Court Justice 
issues. 
II.  THE FACTUAL  
NARRATIVE 
On October 11, 2001, Robert Nicastro (“Nicastro”), a long-time 
employee at Curcio Scrap Metal in Saddle Brook, New Jersey, was 
operating a three-ton metal-shearing machine, a McIntyre Model 640 
Shear.11 His right hand became lodged in the machine and the blade 
severed four fingers off that hand.12 He sued the foreign 
manufacturer and its U.S. distributor in a New Jersey superior court 
on a theory of products liability.13 The manufacturer filed a motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.14 The distributor declared 
bankruptcy and did not participate in the lawsuit.15 
The manufacturer of the machine, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. 
(“McIntyre UK”), was a British company with its principal place of 
business in Nottingham, England.16 It manufactured heavy industrial 
machinery used in scrap metal recycling and, during the relevant 
time frame, sold its products throughout the world, including in the 
United States. From at least 1994 through 2001, McIntyre Machinery 
America, Ltd. (“McIntyre America”), an Ohio corporation with its 
principal place of business in Ohio, served as the exclusive 
distributor and agent for McIntyre UK products sold in the United 
States.17 McIntyre America was not a subsidiary of McIntyre UK, 
and neither company participated in the ownership or management of 
the other.18 
 
 11. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd. (Nicastro I), 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 12. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd. (Nicastro II), 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010), 
rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 13. Id. at 577–78. 
 14. Id. at 578. 
 15. Id. at 578 n.2. 
 16. Id. at 579. 
 17. Id. at 577–78, 592. 
 18. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
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In 1994 or 1995, Frank Curcio (“Curcio”), the owner of Curcio 
Scrap Metal, attended the annual Institute of Scrap Metal 
Industries (ISRI) convention in Las Vegas, Nevada.19 The ISRI 
convention, which is held annually in a U.S. city, is “the world’s 
largest scrap recycling industry trade show.”20 It attracts “owners 
[and] managers of scrap processing companies” and others 
“interested in seeing—and purchasing—new equipment.”21 
Representatives of McIntyre UK attended each of the annual ISRI 
conventions between 1990 and 2005,22 and McIntyre UK and 
McIntyre America operated a jointly sponsored booth at the ISRI Las 
Vegas conventions held in 1994 and 1995, at which they displayed 
and sold McIntyre UK’s machines, including the Model 640 Shear.23 
While at the ISRI convention, Curcio visited the McIntyre booth 
and learned about the Model 640 Shear.24 Upon his return home, his 
company ordered a Model 640 Shear from McIntyre America at a 
price of $24,900.25 The machine was constructed in England and 
shipped from there by McIntyre UK to McIntyre America in Ohio, 
which then delivered the machine to Curcio Scrap Metal in New 
Jersey.26 There was no evidence that McIntyre UK knew that the 
machine was destined for New Jersey when it shipped the Model 640 
Shear to Ohio.27 The invoice indicated that Curcio had purchased the 
machine from McIntyre America, but a metal plate on the machine 
and the accompanying documentation, both of which included 
McIntyre UK’s address and telephone number, indicated that 
McIntyre UK in England had manufactured the machine.28 Given 
 
 19. Joint Appendix at 78a, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) 
(No. 09-1343). 
 20. Id. at 47a. 
 21. Id. at 48a–49a. 
 22. Id. at 114a–115a. 
 23. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d at 96. 
 24. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 78a–79a. 
 25. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d at 96. 
 26. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 78a–79a. 
 27. Id. at 117a. During discovery, McIntyre UK was unable to locate any of the purchase 
orders it had received from McIntyre America. The UK company admitted, however, that 
“additional documents may exist . . . but they would be contained in the large volume of 
[McIntyre UK’s] business records that were appropriated by the receiver appointed to oversee the 
receivership of [McIntyre UK’s] former parent company.” Id. at 118a. 
 28. Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 578 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
  
348 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:341 
this information, Curcio concluded that if he needed any repairs or 
parts, he would contact McIntyre UK.29 
It is possible that other McIntyre UK products were sold in New 
Jersey, but the record clearly establishes only the one sale to 
Curcio.30 With respect to sales throughout the United States, 
McIntyre UK claimed to have no access to the records, but in 2002 a 
McIntyre UK spokesperson described McIntyre UK’s shears as being 
well-established in the United States.31 In addition, in answers to 
interrogatories, McIntyre UK stated that its commissioning engineer 
had installed McIntyre UK products in Virginia, Illinois, 
Washington, Iowa, and Kentucky.32 Answers to other interrogatories 
indicated that McIntyre UK had been sued in Illinois, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, and West Virginia.33 
Between 1990 and 2005, representatives of McIntyre UK 
attended twenty-six scrap metal marketing events held in the United 
States, including each of the annual ISRI conventions.34 These events 
were held in various U.S. cities, including Chicago, Las Vegas, New 
Orleans, Orlando, San Antonio, San Diego, and San Francisco.35 
McIntyre UK attended the events for the purpose of promoting the 
sale of the company’s products to “anyone interested in the machine 
from anywhere in the United States.”36 No area of the United States 
was deemed off limits under this distribution scheme. Michael 
Pownall, the president of McIntyre UK, attended the conventions 
held in Las Vegas in 1994 and 1995, as well as several others held in 
different U.S. cities.37 
The distribution arrangement under which McIntyre UK and 
McIntyre America operated is somewhat elusive. This is due, in part, 
to the unavailability of critical business records, such as McIntyre 
 
 29. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 78a. 
 30. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d at 99. 
 31. Id. at 98 (quoting Brian Taylor, McIntyre Names North American Distributor, 
RECYCLING TODAY, May 16, 2002, available at http://www.recyclingtoday.com/Article.aspx 
?article_id=18315). 
 32. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 119a. 
 33. Id. at 108a; see, e.g., Whitaker v. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 2004 WL 1586989 (Ky. Ct. 
App. July 16, 2004). 
 34. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 114a–117a. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 161a. 
 37. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
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America purchase orders, as noted above. Correspondence and  
e-mail exchanges between the companies do make it clear, however, 
that McIntyre UK sought to exploit the entire U.S. market, that 
McIntyre America took direction and guidance from McIntyre UK in 
the advertising and sales of McIntyre UK products,38 that McIntyre 
America was responsible for sales and distribution in the entire U.S. 
market, and that the two companies jointly sponsored McIntyre 
booths at ISRI conventions.39 As to the actual operation of the 
distribution scheme, McIntyre UK claimed that the Model 640 
Shears were made “to order,” i.e., only after McIntyre America had 
completed a sale and submitted a purchase order to McIntyre UK.40 
McIntyre UK further claimed that it sold the Model 640 Shear 
directly to McIntyre America without knowledge of the ultimate 
purchaser.41 But the record reveals a somewhat more fluid system 
under which the “sale” to McIntyre America was not deemed 
complete until McIntyre America remitted the ultimate purchaser’s 
payment to McIntyre UK, less a “commission.”42 Moreover, 
McIntyre UK retained the right to collect any unsold stock sitting in 
the McIntyre America warehouse.43 Consistent with the foregoing, 
McIntyre UK monitored the size of the McIntyre America inventory 
and asserted a right to “collect” unsold merchandise sitting in 
McIntyre America’s Ohio warehouse.44 
In short, McIntyre UK manufactured a three-ton industrial 
metal-processing machine known as the Model 640 Shear; McIntyre 
UK actively promoted the sale of that machine and some of its other 
products throughout the United States, both directly and through its 
exclusive distributor, McIntyre America; McIntyre UK sought to 
serve the entire U.S. market but made no special effort either to serve 
or exclude the New Jersey market; as a direct consequence of 
McIntyre UK’s national marketing effort, a New Jersey business—
Curcio Scrap Metal—ordered a Model 640 Shear from McIntyre 
America, which had either previously obtained the machine from 
McIntyre UK or submitted a purchase order for the machine based 
 
 38. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 123a–124a. 
 39. Id. at 123a–128a. 
 40. Id. at 170a. 
 41. Id. at 171a. 
 42. Id. at 131a. 
 43. Id. at 135a. 
 44. Id. 
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on the potential sale to Curcio Scrap Metal; McIntyre America 
delivered the Model 640 Shear to Curcio Scrap Metal in New Jersey, 
where it was used in the regular course of business, which use led to 
Nicastro’s injuries.45 
III.  THE DOCTRINAL  
LANDSCAPE 
Nicastro filed a products liability suit against McIntyre UK in a 
New Jersey superior court claiming that the Model 640 Shear was 
unreasonably dangerous.46 His wife joined him in the suit, alleging a 
loss of consortium.47 After being served, McIntyre UK filed a motion 
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.48 Before examining the 
state court proceedings on McIntyre UK’s motion49 it might be 
helpful, especially for those who are not steeped in the lore of 
procedure, to describe the doctrinal landscape as it stood when 
McIntyre UK filed its motion. 
The basics, at least, are easy and should be familiar to anyone 
who has survived a first-year course in civil procedure. A state court 
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only 
if that defendant is served while the defendant is physically present 
in the state, consents to the exercise of jurisdiction, waives any 
objection to the exercise of jurisdiction, or has established “minimum 
contacts” with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction 
under a state long-arm statute over her would not offend “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”50 As to the minimum-
contacts test, the threshold requirement of this due process standard 
is that the nonresident defendant must have engaged in conduct 
purposefully directed at the forum state.51 From a due process 
perspective, this purposeful affiliation with the forum provides the 
 
 45. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 46. Id. at 95. Nicastro also sued McIntyre America, but the latter declared bankruptcy and 
did not participate in the litigation. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2796 n.2 
(2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 47. Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 578 n.1 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. 
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 48. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d at 95. 
 49. See infra Part IV. 
 50. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 51. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1985). 
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nonresident defendant fair warning that she may be sued in that state 
on claims arising out of her volitional affiliation.52 
In general, questions of purposeful direction or purposeful 
availment tend to be of one of the following types: (1) activities 
engaged in by the nonresident defendant or her agents in the forum 
state; (2) contractual relations between the nonresident defendant and 
a resident of the forum state; (3) the placement by the nonresident 
defendant of a product into the stream of commerce with an eventual 
retail sale of that product in the forum state; or (4) tortious activity 
engaged in by the nonresident defendant outside of the forum state 
that causes a foreseeable effect in the forum state. Each type requires 
a “highly realistic”53 appraisal of the facts in light of the appropriate 
legal standards, the goal being to determine whether the nonresident 
defendant’s conduct can be properly characterized as purposefully 
directed at the forum state and thereby provide her with fair warning 
of a potential lawsuit in that state.54 
Nicastro’s lawsuit against McIntyre UK implicated the stream-
of-commerce form of purposeful affiliation.55 The stream-of-
commerce test typically applies in products liability cases. The basic 
outline is simple. A manufacturer located in one state (or foreign 
country), say State A, sells or transfers its product to a second entity, 
which then delivers the product into another state, say State B, where 
the product is sold at retail and where it then causes an injury. The 
stream starts in the state (or country) of manufacture—State A—and 
ends in the state of retail sale—State B. The ultimate question in any 
such case is whether, under the given facts, the manufacturer’s 
placement of the product into the stream of commerce in State A 
constitutes the manufacturer’s purposeful contact with State B, the 
 
 52. Id. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980)). 
 53. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479. 
 54. See generally ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND 
PROBLEMS 84–86, 90–91 (4th ed. 2012) (providing background on proper jurisdiction under the 
applicable long-arm statute and the minimum-contacts test). 
 55. One could also have plausibly argued that McIntyre UK’s conduct fell into each of the 
other three categories. Thus, if McIntyre America were deemed the agent for McIntyre UK, one 
could argue that McIntyre America’s sale of the Model 640 Shear to Curcio Scrap Metal in New 
Jersey was attributable to McIntyre UK. Similarly, the sales contract between McIntyre America 
and Curcio Scrap Metal and any warranty of the Model 640 Shear by McIntyre UK might be seen 
as contractual relations with a New Jersey resident. Finally, if the effects test were read broadly 
(it generally is not), one could argue that that the design and manufacture of the Model 640 Shear 
in England had a foreseeable, injurious effect in New Jersey. 
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state of retail sale and injury. Stated somewhat differently, we want 
to know whether our manufacturer purposefully availed itself of the 
benefits and protections of State B’s laws. 
The Supreme Court first endorsed the stream-of-commerce 
theory in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson56 but held that the 
standards of the theory were not satisfied under the facts presented 
since the suit was not brought in the state of retail sale (New York) 
but in a state to which the purchaser of the automobile in question 
had later traveled (Oklahoma) after the retail sale had been 
consummated.57 Given that the doctrine did not apply, the Court 
provided no further guidance as to its scope or operation. 
The Court next examined of the stream-of-commerce theory in 
Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court.58 That case 
involved a motorcycle accident that took place in California and was 
alleged to have been caused by the failure of a defective tire tube or 
by the valve on that tube. Asahi manufactured the valve in Japan, 
then shipped it to Taiwan, where Cheng Shin bought the valve and 
incorporated it into a Cheng Shin tire tube, which Cheng Shin then 
shipped to California, where the plaintiff purchased the tube at retail. 
The plaintiff sued several defendants in a California state court, 
including Cheng Shin but not Asahi. Cheng Shin filed a cross-claim 
against Asahi for indemnification. The case settled between the 
plaintiff and the defendants, and all that remained before the state 
courts was the cross-claim between Cheng Shin and Asahi.59 The 
question before the Supreme Court was whether California courts 
could exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi under these 
circumstances. Eight members of the Court agreed that, regardless of 
whether Asahi had purposeful contacts with California, it would be 
unreasonable for the courts of California to exercise jurisdiction over 
the Japanese company under the circumstances presented: a claim 
between foreign parties on a question likely subject to foreign law 
over which the state of California had no legitimate interest given 
that the resident plaintiff’s claims had been settled.60 
 
 56. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 57. Id. at 297–98. 
 58. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 59. Id. at 105–08. 
 60. Id. at 113–16. 
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While a strong majority of the Court agreed that the exercise of 
jurisdiction over Asahi would be unreasonable, the Court could not 
agree on the appropriate standards to apply under the stream-of-
commerce test. Four Justices (Justices Brennan, et al.) said that 
placing a product in the stream was itself sufficient to establish 
purposeful availment, as long as the defendant had been aware that 
the final product was being marketed in the forum state as part of the 
“regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to 
distribution to retail sale.”61 Four other Justices (Justices O’Connor, 
et al.) insisted that a more “substantial connection” was required, i.e., 
some additional “action of the defendant purposely directed toward 
the forum State,” such as advertising or soliciting sales in the forum 
state; establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers 
in the forum state; or creating, controlling, or employing the 
distribution system that brought its products into the forum state.62 
The ninth Justice (Justice Stevens) declined to endorse either 
approach but emphasized the importance of taking the volume, 
value, and hazardous nature of the product into account, and on that 
basis he suggested that purposeful availment had been satisfied.63 
Asahi was decided in 1987, and for the next twenty-four years 
the Court offered no clarification of the stream-of-commerce theory. 
As a consequence, state courts and lower federal courts grappled 
with the conflicting messages emanating from the Asahi stream-of-
commerce opinions; some adopted Justice Brennan’s “pure” stream-
of-commerce model, some adopted Justice O’Connor’s “something 
more” or “plus” stream-of-commerce model, and others adopted a 
hybrid approach that depended on whether the product at issue was a 
finished product or a component part. There were also a lot of 
nuances in between each of the chosen approaches.64 In short, when 
McIntyre UK filed its motion to dismiss before the New Jersey trial 
court, the doctrinal scope of the stream-of-commerce theory was 
unsettled and had been in that state for just shy of a quarter of a 
century. 
 
 61. Id. at 116–21 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 108–13 (plurality opinion). 
 63. Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 64. See IDES & MAY, supra note 54, at 129. 
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IV.  THE PROCEEDINGS  
IN STATE COURT 
As noted above, after being served, McIntyre UK filed a motion 
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.65 The trial court initially 
granted the motion, but the Appellate Division of the New Jersey 
Superior Court reversed and remanded the case to allow for 
jurisdictional discovery.66 After the completion of that discovery, 
McIntyre UK renewed its motion to dismiss, which the trial court 
again granted, finding that the defendant “does not have a single 
contact with New Jersey short of the machine in question ending up 
in this state.”67 Moreover, the trial court explained, the defendant 
“had no knowledge of the business dealings between [McIntyre 
America] and its customers, including Curcio, concerning the at-
issue shear.”68 The trial court further found “no evidence here 
establishing that the defendant had any expectation that its product 
would be purchased and utilized in New Jersey.”69 
The appellate court again reversed.70 The court issued a lengthy 
opinion that provided a detailed account of the facts, a survey of the 
law of jurisdiction—with a specific focus on the stream-of-
commerce theory, including an application of Justice O’Connor’s 
something-more standard—and concluded that McIntyre UK was 
subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.71 The essence of the 
appellate court’s reasoning is captured in the following passage: 
Defendant designated McIntyre America as its 
exclusive distributor for the entire United States. Therefore, 
anyone in any state that wished to purchase one of 
defendant’s machines was required to purchase it from 
McIntyre America, defendant’s exclusive sales agent in this 
country. This was not a temporary or fleeting arrangement. 
From at least as early as 1995, when Curcio purchased the 
machine, until its bankruptcy in 2001, McIntyre America 
enjoyed this relationship with defendant on an ongoing 
 
 65. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 66. Id. at 99 n.1. 
 67. Id. at 99. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 95. 
 71. See id. at 99–109. 
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basis. The relationship was established by defendant for the 
purpose of selling its machines in all fifty states. The 
machines were designed to conform with United States 
standards as well as those in the United Kingdom. McIntyre 
America traded on defendant’s name and held itself out as 
“America’s Link to Quality Metal Processing Equipment.” 
. . . . 
Defendant was well aware that McIntyre America was 
not the end user of the many machines it sold to McIntyre 
America over the years. By definition, McIntyre America 
was defendant’s distributor and its function was to resell the 
machines to end users. These are large, potentially 
dangerous, industrial machines, designed for a limited 
market of users engaged in the metal recycling industry. 
The machines are designed for use in a stationary location 
in an industrial setting. Thus, it would reasonably be 
anticipated by defendant and McIntyre America that upon 
sale to the end user, the machine would remain at its 
location for use by workers there. 
When defendant sold and shipped machines to 
McIntyre America in Ohio, defendant did not do so with the 
purpose of availing itself of the Ohio market. When 
defendant’s senior management personnel attended trade 
conventions in Las Vegas and other United States cities to 
display its machines and seek buyers for them (through 
McIntyre America), its purpose was not to sell machines for 
use in Las Vegas or those other cities. Defendant was 
engaged in purposeful conduct to avail itself of the entire 
United States market, namely to effect sales, through its 
exclusive distributor, to end users in all fifty states, 
including New Jersey. 
The sale of the machine to Curcio was not the result of 
conduct by a party unrelated to defendant and it was not an 
isolated transaction. It was the result of the very distribution 
scheme purposefully established by defendant for the sale 
of its machines to potential customers located anywhere 
  
356 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:341 
within the exclusive sales territory of McIntyre America. 
That territory included New Jersey.72 
McIntyre UK appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.73 
The New Jersey Supreme Court began its opinion with a long—
very long—windup that included a description of the facts; the 
proceedings, including the Appellate Division of the New Jersey 
Superior Court’s opinion; the arguments by the parties and a 
participating amicus; and a history lesson on the development of the 
law of jurisdiction, both nationally and in New Jersey, with a specific 
discussion of stream-of-commerce theory, including Justice 
O’Connor’s something-more standard.74 As to the something-more 
standard, the opinion noted that several courts had interpreted Justice 
O’Connor’s standard as having been satisfied in the context of 
foreign manufacturers that employed national marketing schemes 
resulting in sales and injuries in the forum state.75 The state high 
court then pitched the following stream-of-commerce standard down 
the middle of the plate: 
A foreign manufacturer will be subject to this State’s 
jurisdiction if it knows or reasonably should know that 
through its distribution scheme its products are being sold 
in New Jersey. A manufacturer that knows or reasonably 
should know that its products are distributed through a 
nationwide distribution system that might lead to those 
products being sold in any of the fifty states must expect 
that it will be subject to this State’s jurisdiction if one of its 
defective products is sold to a New Jersey consumer, 
causing injury. The focus is not on the manufacturer’s 
control of the distribution scheme, but rather on the 
manufacturer’s knowledge of the distribution scheme 
through which it is receiving economic benefits in each 
state where its products are sold.76 
The court found that the standard was satisfied under the facts 
presented: 
 
 72. Id. at 104–05. 
 73. Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 74. Id. at 577–92. 
 75. Id. at 589–90. 
 76. Id. at 591–92 (citations omitted). 
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[W]e find that the record supports the exercise of 
jurisdiction over J. McIntyre under the stream-of-commerce 
doctrine. J. McIntyre, a company incorporated in the United 
Kingdom, targeted the United States market for the sale of 
its recycling products. It did so by engaging McIntyre 
America, an Ohio-based company, as its exclusive United 
States distributor for an approximately seven-year period 
ending in 2001. J. McIntyre knew or reasonably should 
have known that the distribution system extended to the 
entire United States, because its company officials, along 
with McIntyre America officials, attended scrap metal trade 
shows and conventions in various American cities where its 
products were advertised. Indeed, J. McIntyre’s president 
was present at the Las Vegas trade convention where his 
exclusive distributor introduced plaintiff’s employer to the 
allegedly defective McIntyre Model 640 Shear that severed 
four of plaintiff’s fingers. 
It is clear that those attending the scrap metal trade 
shows and conventions came from areas other than the 
cities hosting those events, and that the joint appearances by 
J. McIntyre and McIntyre America were calculated efforts 
to penetrate the overall American market. Plaintiff’s 
employer, a New Jersey businessman, is just one example 
of a person who traveled thousands of miles to a convention 
where, by dint of a sales effort, he purchased one of 
J. McIntyre’s machines. J. McIntyre may not have had 
access to McIntyre America’s customer list, but J. McIntyre 
knew or reasonably should have known that its machines 
were being sold in states other than Ohio and in cities other 
than where the trade conventions were held. J. McIntyre 
may not have known the precise destination of a purchased 
machine, but it clearly knew or should have known that the 
products were intended for sale and distribution to 
customers located anywhere in the United States.77 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.78 
 
 77. Id. at 592–93. 
 78. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010). 
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V.  THE OPINIONS OF THE  
SUPREME COURT OF  
THE UNITED STATES 
A.  The Plurality 
Justice Kennedy authored a plurality opinion announcing the 
judgment of the Court reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
decision.79 The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined 
the opinion.80 Justice Kennedy’s opinion disappoints on a number of 
levels, the most important of which is that it utterly fails to clarify the 
doctrinal standards. It will also disappoint anyone who expects the 
Supreme Court Justices to take language seriously, to interpret 
precedents fairly, or to explain in cogent terms why the applicable 
law demands a particular outcome. 
1.  Minor Flaws: Doctrinal Indifference 
Part II of the plurality opinion begins with a four-paragraph 
mini-survey of the law of personal jurisdiction. The survey gets some 
things right, gets some things wrong, and leaves much unsaid. From 
one point of view, minor “flaws” in the introductory passages of a 
Supreme Court opinion are of little import and easily ignored. But 
details do matter (at least that’s what I teach my students), and when 
an opinion begins its foray into the law with a careless exposition of 
the underlying doctrine, at a minimum one loses confidence in the 
Justice’s ability to reason through the case’s more critical aspects. 
And all too often today’s minor flaw becomes tomorrow’s new 
doctrine. So even if such peccadilloes do not poison the well of 
reasoning, they should serve as a warning to anyone who is about to 
draw the water. 
The first two paragraphs of Part II are unremarkable. They 
reaffirm the threshold minimum-contacts standard of purposeful 
availment and make it clear that this standard applies in products 
liability cases.81 Regardless of what one may think the law of 
 
 79. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 2786–87. 
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jurisdiction ought to be, the plurality correctly states what the law is 
and has been for some time.82 
The next two paragraphs are a bit more problematic. In the first 
of these, the plurality describes three traditional ways in which “[a] 
person may submit to a State’s [jurisdictional] authority”: “explicit” 
consent, presence, and domicile.83 As the plurality explains it, 
“These examples support exercise of the general jurisdiction of the 
State’s courts and allow the State to resolve both matters that 
originate within the State and those based on activities and events 
elsewhere.”84 That is not entirely correct. While presence and 
domicile will validate the exercise of general jurisdiction, explicit 
consent is significantly less likely to do so. For example, most 
explicit-consent forum selection clauses include an “arise out of” or 
“relates to” requirement85 and do not, therefore, subject a party who 
is bound by the clause to general jurisdiction in the selected forum. I 
doubt that the plurality intended to signal a change in the law of 
forum selection clauses. So we can count this as an example of 
confident carelessness. Note as well that the plurality makes no 
mention of a fourth traditional basis for asserting jurisdiction, 
 
 82. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The plurality does, however, make 
one odd observation toward the end of the second paragraph in Part II. “[I]n some cases,” says the 
plurality, “as with an intentional tort, the defendant might well fall within the State’s authority by 
reason of his attempt to obstruct its laws.” J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality opinion). The 
plurality cites no authority for this somewhat ambiguous and extraneous proposition. On the one 
hand, the proposition appears sound to the extent that it describes a sufficient condition for the 
assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose extraterritorial tortious act causes a 
foreseeable effect (obstruction of the laws) in the forum state. This would be a special instance of 
the effects test established in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). On the other hand, the 
plurality’s proposition, which is stated as an exception to a general principle of purposeful 
availment, can be interpreted to mean that “obstruction” is a necessary component of the effects 
test. If this is the intended sense of the quoted language, the proposition represents a significant 
narrowing of the standard established by a unanimous Court in Calder—a standard that focuses 
on the focal point of the harm and not in any fashion on a concept of obstruction. Id. at 789–90. 
Why describe a narrow instance of a particular jurisdictional standard without referencing the 
standard, if not to narrow that standard to the particularized instance? Or is the proposition 
nothing more than a chatty and somewhat careless statement signifying nothing about the 
overarching standard? Or does the author actually know what the standard is? 
 83. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality opinion). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Maxwell J. Wright, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses: An Examination of the 
Current Disarray of Federal Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and a Proposal for Judicial 
Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1625, 1627 (2011) (“A forum-selection clause is a contract 
provision under which the parties agree to file any suit arising under their contract in a specified 
forum.” (emphasis added)). 
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voluntary appearance, which could be seen as a form of consent but 
not necessarily explicit consent. 
The next paragraph describes specific jurisdiction as “a more 
limited form of submission to a State’s authority.”86 In the plurality’s 
words, “[S]ubmission through contact with and activity directed at a 
sovereign may justify specific jurisdiction ‘in a suit arising out of or 
related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”87 This is correct, 
though one might quibble with the “submission” characterization, 
but we will want to see what the plurality means by “activity directed 
at a sovereign.” Hint: we won’t be told. 
Overall, with respect to these latter two paragraphs, the 
plurality’s attempt to define the line between general jurisdiction and 
specific jurisdiction as being a demarcation between an incomplete 
list of traditional forms of jurisdiction (explicit consent, presence, 
and domicile) and contacts-premised jurisdiction is both artificial and 
incomplete. I have already mentioned the absence of voluntary 
appearance as a traditional form of jurisdictional submission to the 
sovereign. Like consent, a voluntary appearance can trigger either 
general or specific jurisdiction depending on the nature of the case in 
which the voluntary appearance is made. In addition, general 
jurisdiction is not limited to the traditional bases of jurisdiction but 
can be based on the substantiality of the nonresident defendant’s 
purposeful contacts with the forum state.88 Perhaps the plurality 
would say that, in the latter circumstance, the nonresident defendant 
is “present” in the state, signaling a return to the “fiction” approach 
to jurisdiction abandoned in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.89 
In any event, a reader seeking a basic understanding of the law of 
personal jurisdiction would be sorely misled by the plurality’s 
exegesis. 
In short, the plurality’s discussion of the foundational legal 
standards is imprecise, incomplete, and at points mistaken. None of 
this matters much, except that it leaves the reader with a sense that 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 2788 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 
n.414 (1984)). 
 88. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011). 
Notably, Goodyear Dunlop was decided the same day as J. McIntyre and, being a unanimous 
decision, was joined by each member of the plurality. Id. at 2846, 2850. 
 89. 326 U.S. 310, 316–19 (1945). 
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the plurality has either a muddled view of the background principles 
or simply does not care enough about them. 
2.  Not-So-Minor Flaw: Interpretive Laxity 
Having set a purposeful-availment foundation afloat in murky 
waters, the plurality next focuses on what it characterizes as the 
stream-of-commerce metaphor. Here the plurality correctly observes 
that this metaphor (or theory, test, or doctrine) was never meant to 
“amend the general rule of personal jurisdiction.”90 In the plurality’s 
words, the stream-of-commerce metaphor “merely observes that a 
defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to jurisdiction 
without entering the forum—itself an unexceptional proposition—as 
where manufacturers or distributors ‘seek to serve’ a given State’s 
market.”91 In other words, stream-of-commerce analysis is not a 
substitute for purposeful availment but a method through which to 
determine whether the purposeful-availment standard has been 
satisfied. So far, so good. But now the plurality leaps from the 
analytical utility of the metaphor to a fixed definition of it: “The 
defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction 
only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum.”92 
Perhaps the plurality is invoking Justice O’Connor’s something-more 
or stream-of-commerce-plus model. Or, on the theory that new 
words may signify a new direction, it could be that the plurality is 
endorsing a new and stricter standard. We’ll return to this “target” 
metaphor momentarily. 
The plurality saw its mission as presenting “an opportunity to 
provide greater clarity”93 to the “decades-old questions left open in 
Asahi.”94 One would expect, then, a careful exegesis of the Asahi 
opinions and their unsettled aftermath. Oddly enough, the plurality’s 
discussion of Asahi and lower courts’ efforts to apply that case is 
remarkably brief. The bulk of it consists of three paragraphs: 
In Asahi, an opinion by Justice Brennan for four 
Justices outlined a different approach. It discarded the 
central concept of sovereign authority in favor of 
 
 90. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion). 
 91. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)). 
 92. Id. (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. at 2786. 
 94. Id. at 2785. 
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considerations of fairness and foreseeability. As that 
concurrence contended, “jurisdiction premised on the 
placement of a product into the stream of commerce 
[without more] is consistent with the Due Process Clause,” 
for “[a]s long as a participant in this process is aware that 
the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the 
possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.” It 
was the premise of the concurring opinion that the 
defendant’s ability to anticipate suit renders the assertion of 
jurisdiction fair. In this way, the opinion made 
foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction. 
The standard set forth in Justice Brennan’s concurrence 
was rejected in an opinion written by Justice O’Connor; but 
the relevant part of that opinion, too, commanded the assent 
of only four Justices, not a majority of the Court. That 
opinion stated: “The ‘substantial connection’ between the 
defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of 
minimum contacts must come about by an action of the 
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. 
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, 
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully 
directed toward the forum State.” 
Since Asahi was decided, the courts have sought to 
reconcile the competing opinions. But Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence, advocating a rule based on general notions of 
fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent with the premises 
of lawful judicial power. This Court’s precedents make 
clear that it is the defendant’s actions, not his expectations, 
that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.95 
Let’s begin by examining what Justice Brennan actually said in 
Asahi. He began his Asahi opinion with this sentence, “I do not agree 
with [Justice O’Connor’s] interpretation . . . of the stream-of-
commerce theory, nor with the conclusion that Asahi did not 
‘purposefully avail itself of the California market.’”96 He then 
explained his theory as follows: 
 
 95. Id. at 2788–89 (citations omitted). 
 96. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
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The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable 
currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of 
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As 
long as a participant in this process is aware that the final 
product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility 
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise. Nor will the 
litigation present a burden for which there is no 
corresponding benefit. A defendant who has placed goods 
in the stream of commerce benefits economically from the 
retail sale of the final product in the forum State, and 
indirectly benefits from the State’s laws that regulate and 
facilitate commercial activity. These benefits accrue 
regardless of whether that participant directly conducts 
business in the forum State, or engages in additional 
conduct directed toward that State. Accordingly, most 
courts and commentators have found that jurisdiction 
premised on the placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause, and 
have not required a showing of additional conduct.97 
After this introductory discussion, Brennan provided a detailed 
account of the Court’s decision in World-Wide Volkswagen, and 
quoted, with approval, the following passages from that opinion: 
[T]his is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly 
irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due 
process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product 
will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the 
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State 
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled 
into Court there. . . . 
. . . Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or 
distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an 
isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the 
manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, 
the market for its product in other States, it is not 
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its 
allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source 
of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not 
 
 97. Id. at 117. 
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exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts 
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its 
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation 
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum 
State.98 
Brennan ended his Asahi opinion by explaining why, in his 
view, “the facts found by the California Supreme Court support its 
finding of minimum contacts.”99 Here he focused on “Asahi’s regular 
and extensive sales of component parts to a manufacturer it knew 
was making regular sales of the final product in California.”100 
One could certainly disagree with Justice Brennan’s application 
of the purposeful-availment standard in Asahi, though a majority of 
the Asahi Court apparently did not.101 But whatever one might say 
about his Asahi opinion, a description of it as endorsing a “fairness 
and forseeability” theory or as premised on “general fairness” 
principles is not even marginally credible.102 Among other things, 
Justice Brennan only alluded to fairness once in his stream-of-
commerce discussion, and then only in reference to the contacts-
premised rationale of the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen.103 
Instead of “fairness,” the clear focus of Brennan’s Asahi opinion was 
on what he thought constitutes purposeful availment. 
As to foreseeability, Brennan did endorse the foreseeability-of-
being-haled-into-court-standard, but that standard is premised on the 
nonresident’s contacts with the forum state, for it is the purposeful 
contacts with the forum that lead to the foreseeability of being sued 
 
 98. Id. at 119–20 (citations omitted). 
 99. Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 121. 
 101. Three members of the Court (Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) joined Justice 
Brennan’s plurality, and Justice Stevens, writing separately, seemed to agree: 
In most circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing 
that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years 
would constitute “purposeful availment” even though the item delivered to the forum 
State was a standard product marketed throughout the world. 
Id. at 122. Notably, Justices White and Blackmun joined this opinion, suggesting a strong 
commonality between the Brennan and Stevens models. Id. at 121. 
 102. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788–89 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 103. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119 (“The [World-Wide Volkswagen] Court reasoned that when a 
corporation may reasonably anticipate litigation in a particular forum, it cannot claim that such 
litigation is unjust or unfair, because it ‘can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by 
procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to consumers, or, if the risks are too great, 
severing its connection with the State.’” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))). 
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there. Moreover, Brennan’s acceptance of that version of 
foreseeability was hardly noteworthy since the Court had endorsed 
precisely that standard in both World-Wide Volkswagen104 and 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.105 But more to the point, Brennan’s 
Asahi opinion affirmatively rejected the more generalized approach 
to foreseeability that the plurality had accused him of adopting: 
“[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the 
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum 
State.”106 And lest there be any doubt, in Burger King, decided two 
years before Asahi, Brennan had authored the opinion for the Court 
and in that opinion specifically rejected the generalized approach to 
foreseeability as not providing a “sufficient benchmark” for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction.107 
Whatever stream-of-commerce metaphor the plurality would 
like to endorse, the road to that metaphor should not be paved with 
such an obvious interpretive gaffe. 
Equally flawed, but for a different reason, is the plurality’s 
“interpretation” of Justice O’Connor’s Asahi opinion. In essence, the 
plurality offers no interpretation. Aside from quoting O’Connor’s 
“something more” admonition,108 the plurality makes no effort to 
examine the O’Connor version of stream of commerce, either in the 
abstract or in practical application. In fact, the plurality’s only other 
allusion to O’Connor’s opinion is the following: “The conclusion 
that the authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends on 
purposeful availment, consistent with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 
Asahi, does not by itself resolve many difficult questions of 
 
 104. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 105. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). “[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant 
purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum state . . . . ‘[T]he foreseeability that is 
critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum 
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court here.’” Id. at 474 
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). 
 106. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119 (emphasis added) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 
297). 
 107. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. Prior to the decision in Burger King, Justice Brennan had 
endorsed the foreseeability-of-injury-in-the-forum standard. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 
U.S. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 226 (1977) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). But in his Burger King majority opinion, Justice 
Brennan abandoned that endorsement, describing his previous position as having been 
“consistently” rejected by the Court. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 n.16. Nothing in Brennan’s 
Asahi opinion even hints at a return to his previously held views. Indeed, that opinion reiterates 
Brennan’s acceptance of the haled-into-court standard. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119. 
 108. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
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jurisdiction that will arise in particular cases.”109 Of course this is 
true. No doctrinal standard (aside from an absolutist one) can solve 
all the difficult, fact-based questions that arise under the standard. 
But, given the plurality’s mission of clarification, one would expect a 
relatively careful examination of the something-more option. 
Here is what Justice O’Connor had to say about her proposed 
standard, followed by her application of that standard to the Asahi 
facts: 
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, 
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully 
directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the 
defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the 
market in the forum State, for example, designing the 
product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the 
forum State, establishing channels for providing regular 
advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the 
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the 
sales agent in the forum State. But a defendant’s awareness 
that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product 
into the forum State does not convert the mere act of 
placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully 
directed toward the forum State. 
Assuming, arguendo, that respondents have established 
Asahi’s awareness that some of the valves sold to Cheng 
Shin would be incorporated into tire tubes sold in 
California, respondents have not demonstrated any action 
by Asahi to purposefully avail itself of the California 
market. Asahi does not do business in California. It has no 
office, agents, employees, or property in California. It does 
not advertise or otherwise solicit business in California. It 
did not create, control, or employ the distribution system 
that brought its valves to California. There is no evidence 
that Asahi designed its product in anticipation of sales in 
California. On the basis of these facts, the exertion of 
personal jurisdiction over Asahi by the Superior Court of 
California exceeds the limits of due process.110 
 
 109. Id. at 2790. 
 110. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112–13 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). 
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We can see from this passage that there is a clear distinction 
between the O’Connor and Brennan approaches. Both demand 
purposeful availment, but O’Connor insists on additional forum-
directed contacts beyond the nonresident defendant’s participation in 
the regular and anticipated flow of the commercial stream into the 
forum state. And she provides a nonexclusive list of possibilities to 
elucidate what she believes would satisfy her standard. Further, 
O’Connor explains why she thinks this “something more” was 
lacking in Asahi since the nonresident defendant there had done 
nothing affirmative to promote sales of its product in California. 
Among other things, the Japanese manufacturer “did not create, 
control, or employ the distribution system that brought its valves to 
California.”111 True, Justice O’Connor’s approach does not provide a 
litmus-test solution to the question of purposeful availment, but both 
her description of the factors she considered relevant and her 
application of those factors did help to “clarify the contours of [the] 
principle,”112 to borrow the J. McIntyre plurality’s description of the 
ultimate goal of the case-by-case lawmaking method. 
The plurality’s “clarification” of the Asahi opinions thus takes 
us nowhere. The mischaracterization of Justice Brennan’s approach 
as a fairness-and-foreseeability model is a complete non-starter. It 
seems to be premised on the notion that words don’t matter, that 
interpretation is a type of freestyle wrestling match with no holds 
barred. And the plurality’s failure to examine the “contours” of 
Justice O’Connor’s something-more model leaves the reader without 
any hold whatsoever. Justice O’Connor’s invitation to engage in a 
fact-based examination of the question of purposeful availment is 
treated as nothing more than a generalized, free-floating doctrine, 
unworthy of careful examination or application. 
The plurality ends Part II with platitudes about sovereignty and 
the “genius” of our constitutional system and with a promise that 
“judicial exposition will, in common-law fashion, clarify the 
contours of [the purposeful-availment] principle.”113 But we’re 
already off to a fairly bleak start. 
 
 111. Id. at 112. 
 112. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion). 
 113. Id. 
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3.  Major Flaws: Concepts over Facts 
One of the notable features of the plurality opinion is its 
minimalist and somewhat loaded description of the facts. Part I of the 
opinion purports to describe the “three primary facts” that the 
plaintiffs’ counsel stressed, but the description is more argumentative 
than descriptive and leans heavily toward the defendant’s version of 
those facts: 
First, an independent company agreed to sell 
J. McIntyre’s machines in the United States. J. McIntyre 
itself did not sell its machines to buyers in this country 
beyond the U.S. distributor, and there is no allegation that 
the distributor was under J. McIntyre’s control. 
Second, J. McIntyre officials attended annual 
conventions for the scrap recycling industry to advertise 
J. McIntyre’s machines alongside the distributor. The 
conventions took place in various States, but never in New 
Jersey. 
Third, no more than four machines . . . , including the 
machine that caused the injuries that are the basis for this 
suit, ended up in New Jersey. 
In addition to these facts emphasized by respondent, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that J. McIntyre held 
both United States and European patents on its recycling 
technology. It also noted that the U.S. distributor 
“structured [its] advertising and sales efforts in accordance 
with” J. McIntyre’s “direction and guidance whenever 
possible,” and that “at least some of the machines were sold 
on consignment to” the distributor.114 
The plurality returns to these facts in Part III of its opinion, in 
which it purports to apply its “target” standard of purposeful 
availment. Supposedly, this is the “exposition” that will “clarify” the 
key legal principles by focusing on the “defendant’s conduct and the 
economic realities of the market the defendant seeks to serve . . . .”115 
Here is that promised exposition in total: 
Respondent has not established that J. McIntyre 
engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey. 
 
 114. Id. at 2786 (citations omitted). 
 115. Id. at 2790. 
  
Winter 2012] FOREWORD 369 
Recall that respondent’s claim of jurisdiction centers on 
three facts: The distributor agreed to sell J. McIntyre’s 
machines in the United States; J. McIntyre officials 
attended trade shows in several States but not in New 
Jersey; and up to four machines ended up in New Jersey. 
The British manufacturer had no office in New Jersey; it 
neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and it neither 
advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State. Indeed, 
after discovery the trial court found that the “defendant does 
not have a single contact with New Jersey short of the 
machine in question ending up in this state.” These facts 
may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they do 
not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the 
New Jersey market.116 
Quite obviously, there is no analysis here. This is a restatement 
of the facts at a broad level of generality, followed by a conclusion. 
The most we can say is that the target standard has not been satisfied, 
but why that is the case is difficult to ascertain. 
Suppose the plurality had written a competent opinion that 
accurately described the differences between the Brennan and 
O’Connor stream-of-commerce theories, then explained why it 
preferred one over the other, then followed that with a detailed 
application of the chosen theory. Let’s assume that the O’Connor 
model was deemed the more suitable. A competent (not brilliant, just 
competent) opinion applying that theory would note that McIntyre 
UK did not design its Model 640 Shear specifically for the New 
Jersey market, nor did the company market or advertise its products 
within New Jersey (other than through ads in trade magazines that 
were distributed nationally). On the other hand, our careful 
application of the O’Connor theory would note that McIntyre UK 
did, at least arguably, establish a channel for providing advice and 
customer support by affixing the manufacturer’s name, address, and 
telephone number to its machines sold in the United States. More 
importantly, Justice O’Connor’s emphasis on the distribution system 
would, at a minimum, require us to ask whether McIntyre UK had 
created, controlled, or employed the distribution system that brought 
the Model 640 Shear into New Jersey. (More on this later.) 
 
 116. Id. (citation omitted). 
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Regardless of what one might conclude from such an analysis, 
the exposition would clarify the principle being applied. Of course, 
by treating the case as presenting an abstract question pertaining to 
“submission to sovereignty,”117 the plurality avoids the difficult 
questions and succeeds only at making the law less clear than it was 
before Justice Kennedy (or his clerks) took pen in hand. 
In the end, we’d like to know precisely what standard the 
plurality has adopted. We know that it is not a fairness-and-
foreseeability model; we can presume that it is not Justice Brennan’s 
regular-and-anticipated-flow model (although the plurality never 
actually confronts that model); and we now must doubt that it is 
O’Connor’s something-more model, since the plurality rather 
assiduously avoids asking the questions demanded by that model. 
Perhaps we can describe the target model as some form of 
“plus/plus” under which the nonresident defendant must aim its 
arrow precisely at the bull’s-eye of the forum state. For it is 
apparently the case, from the plurality’s perspective, that if the 
nonresident defendant uses a scattershot weapon with a wider range 
and aims at the states more generally, the fact that any particular 
state finds itself on the receiving end will be of no avail. 
B.  The Concurrence 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the 
judgment reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court.118 Don’t look for 
satisfaction here. Justice Breyer’s opinion reads like a casual tête-à-
tête. Think tea and biscuits. As he sees it, the case is just too easy. 
Given the unremarkable facts, which have no bearing on “recent 
changes in commerce and communication,” and the established 
precedent, which requires no elaboration, there is no apparent reason 
to tarry with the details or the consequences.119 
1.  Outcome Determined by Precedents 
The concurrence relies on the same “three primary facts” as the 
plurality (albeit worded somewhat differently):120 
 
 117. See id. at 2787. 
 118. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Compare id. at 2786 (plurality opinion) (“three primary facts”), with id. at 2791 (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (“three primary facts”). 
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(1) The American Distributor on one occasion sold and 
shipped one machine to a New Jersey customer, namely, 
Mr. Nicastro’s employer, Mr. Curcio; (2) the British 
Manufacturer permitted, indeed wanted, its independent 
American Distributor to sell its machines to anyone in 
America willing to buy them; and (3) representatives of the 
British Manufacturer attended trade shows in “such cities as 
Chicago, Las Vegas, New Orleans, Orlando, San Diego, 
and San Francisco.”121 
Consider the word choice: “on one occasion . . . permitted, 
indeed wanted . . . attended trade shows . . . .” Gosh. One senses 
McIntyre UK pining for a sale somewhere, anywhere in America, 
wandering from trade show to trade show, hoping on hope for just a 
little luck. Dr. Watson might have called it, “The Curious Case of the 
Wistful Manufacturer.” Well it is a clever and useful technique. 
Essentially, Justice Breyer reduces the narrative to the fortuitous and 
inconsequential sale of a widget machine. Coincidentally, that 
reduction fits perfectly with the concurrence’s fabricated (as we will 
see) version of the applicable doctrine. Thus, the concurrence 
instructs the reader that none of the Court’s “precedents finds that a 
single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort 
indicated here [‘permitted, indeed wanted’], is sufficient. Rather, this 
Court’s previous holdings suggest the contrary.”122 Of course, if 
Justice Breyer had been out for a stroll instead of chatting in his 
parlor, he might have tripped over McGee v. International Life 
Insurance Co.,123 the classic single-solicitation case. (Think of 
McGee as a case in which a nonresident defendant targeted one 
solicitation at a forum resident.) 
For his holdings-suggest-to-the-contrary thesis (note his use of 
the plural), Justice Breyer cites one (and only one) case—World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. He describes that case (in full) 
as follows: “The Court has held that a single sale to a customer who 
takes an accident-causing product to a different State (where the 
accident takes place) is not a sufficient basis for asserting 
 
 121. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 578–79 (N.J. 
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)). 
 122. Id. at 2792 (emphasis added). 
 123. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
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jurisdiction.”124 Anywhere? Not even in the state of retail sale? If we 
add the phrase “in the state in which that accident occurred” to the 
end of the foregoing quotation, the sentence becomes descriptively 
accurate, but remains somewhat misleading in the present context. 
The holding in World-Wide Volkswagen instead turned on how the 
product reached the forum state. 
One might have thought that the more relevant aspect of the 
World-Wide Volkswagen decision was the Court’s endorsement of 
the stream-of-commerce theory: “The forum State does not exceed 
its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal 
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the 
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased 
by consumers in the forum State.”125 But no. Somehow 
(unexplained), the concurrence wrings from World-Wide Volkswagen 
an aspersion on the jurisdictional sufficiency of a single sale in the 
forum state, regardless of how that sale came about. 
The only other support Breyer offers for his single-sale-
insufficiency thesis is in reference to the plurality and concurring 
opinions in Asahi: 
And the Court, in separate opinions [in Asahi], has strongly 
suggested that a single sale of a product in a State does not 
constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over 
an out-of-state defendant, even if that defendant places his 
goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) 
that such a sale will take place.126 
(Again with the wistful manufacturer.) Here is his unexpurgated 
defense of that assertion: 
See Asahi Metal Industry Co. . . . (opinion of O’Connor, J.) 
(requiring “something more” than simply placing “a 
product into the stream of commerce,” even if defendant is 
“awar[e]” that the stream “may or will sweep the product 
into the forum State”); (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (jurisdiction should lie where a 
sale in a State is part of “the regular and anticipated flow” 
of commerce into the State, but not where that sale is only 
 
 124. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 125. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980). 
 126. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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an “edd[y],” i.e., an isolated occurrence); (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (indicating 
that “the volume, the value, and the hazardous character” of 
a good may affect the jurisdictional inquiry and 
emphasizing Asahi’s “regular course of dealing”).127 
A quick read of the foregoing quotation might lead one to 
conclude that Justice Breyer basically gets it right: stream-of-
commerce-plus, stream-of-commerce-pure, and multi-factored 
balancing. But keep in mind that these nutshell descriptions are 
presented as suggesting a specific doctrinal standard—single-sale-
insufficiency—that will reduce this case to a biscuit crumb, easily 
brushed off the docket. So a closer look is warranted. 
Clearly, Justice O’Connor did endorse a something-more 
standard. But her something more had nothing to do with the volume 
of sales, single or otherwise. Rather, the entire focus of that standard 
was on whether the nonresident defendant had engaged in additional 
purposeful conduct directed at the forum state, i.e., conduct beyond 
the “placement” and “awareness” elements of the stream-of-
commerce theory: 
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent 
or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for 
example, designing the product for the market in the forum 
State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels 
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum 
State, or marketing the product through a distributor who 
has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.128 
As previously noted, in finding that this something-more 
standard had not been satisfied in Asahi, Justice O’Connor 
specifically pointed out that Asahi “did not create, control, or employ 
the distribution system that brought its valves to California.”129 
 
 127. Id. (citations omitted). 
 128. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). 
 129. Id. at 112–13. Following the quoted material, Justice O’Connor used a “Cf.” cite to a 
district court opinion that upheld jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that had no direct 
contacts with the forum state but that used a distributor to market its products throughout the 
nation. Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 452 F. Supp. 130 (M.D. Pa. 1978). Justice O’Connor’s 
reference to Hicks may not have been an endorsement of the opinion, but it does suggest her 
support of a somewhat more fluid and nuanced approach to the something-more standard than 
one might glean from the plurality and concurring opinions in J. McIntyre. 
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Thus, Justice O’Connor provided a clear idea of what types of 
facts would support a finding of “something more,” none of which 
referenced the quantity of the sales. Presumably, a single sale would 
do the trick, if that sale were heavily promoted or if the defendant 
had employed the distribution system that brought the product into 
the state. While this might be unusual in the case of consumer 
products (the issue in Asahi), it certainly would not be unusual in a 
case involving the sale of heavy, costly industrial machinery (the 
issue in J. McIntyre). Justice Breyer never explains how O’Connor’s 
qualitative-plus translates into a quantitative-minus. He apparently 
assumes that the reader will take the lure. But there is, quite simply, 
no logical chain of reasoning that leads from one to the other.130 
As to the Brennan standard, while Justice Breyer does not adopt 
Justice Kennedy’s fairness-and-foreseeability interpretation of the 
Brennan approach, he offers his own form of interpretive surgery. 
Here’s Brennan: “The stream of commerce refers not to 
unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated 
flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.”131 
Here’s Breyer on Brennan: “[J]urisdiction should lie where a sale in 
a State is part of ‘the regular and anticipated flow’ of commerce into 
the State, but not where that sale is only an ‘edd[y],’ i.e., an isolated 
occurrence.”132 For the real Brennan, an “eddy” is something that is 
unpredictable; for the Breyer version of Brennan, an “eddy” is an 
isolated occurrence.133 These are different things.134 And, most 
importantly, an isolated occurrence can be predictable. For example, 
the single sale of heavy industrial equipment may well be an isolated 
occurrence, but such a sale is not necessarily unpredictable. It is also 
worth mentioning that Brennan’s “regular and anticipated flow” 
pertains to the “retail sale” of consumer goods and not to the 
 
 130. Justice Breyer’s lapse in logic calls to mind to the old Catskills joke, “Boy, the food at 
this place is really terrible . . . and such small portions.” ANNIE HALL (United Artists 1977). 
 131. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 132. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 133. Breyer’s revision of Brennan’s Asahi opinion is much more troubling than Kennedy’s 
fairness-and-foreseeability misinterpretation of that same opinion. The Kennedy misinterpretation 
has no bearing on the plurality’s endorsement of the target standard. With or without that 
misinterpretation, the outcome would be the same. Breyer, on the other hand, uses his revision of 
Brennan as the key grounds on which to resolve the case. 
 134. Webster’s dictionary defines “isolated” as “placed alone or apart: being alone: solitary.” 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1199 (1993). It defines “unpredictable” 
as “not to be foretold.” Id. at 2506. 
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marketing and sale of heavy industrial equipment.135 Justice Breyer 
simply and simplistically assumes that the language Justice Brennan 
used to describe the flow of consumer products is freely transferable 
to describe the sale of heavy industrial machinery; and Breyer makes 
no effort to justify this beyond-the-context leap. In short, if a single-
sale-insufficiency inference is to be drawn from Brennan, it is only 
because Breyer has rewritten and decontextualized Brennan’s 
standard. 
Finally, the concurrence accurately quotes the Stevens balancing 
formula (“the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the 
components”136), with the addendum that Stevens “emphasiz[ed] 
Asahi’s regular course of dealing.”137 Here’s what Stevens said in 
full: 
Over the course of its dealings with Cheng Shin, Asahi has 
arguably engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than 
“[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, 
without more . . . .” Whether or not this conduct rises to the 
level of purposeful availment requires a constitutional 
determination that is affected by the volume, the value, and 
the hazardous character of the components. In most 
circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a regular 
course of dealing that results in deliveries of over 100,000 
units annually over a period of several years would 
constitute “purposeful availment” even though the item 
delivered to the forum State was a standard product 
marketed throughout the world.138 
Nothing in the above quotation suggests that volume operates as 
anything other than one of the factors in the determination of 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. It is 
just as plausible to infer that Justice Stevens would uphold 
jurisdiction in a case involving the single sale (low volume) of an 
expensive (high value) and dangerous (hazardous character) piece of 
industrial equipment as it is to infer the opposite. Note as well that 
 
 135. Webster’s dictionary defines “retail” as “the sale of commodities or goods in small 
quantities to ultimate consumers,” and “retailing” as “the activities involved in the selling goods 
to ultimate consumers for personal or household consumption.” Id. at 1938. 
 136. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 137. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 138. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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Stevens was describing his approach to the sale of a “component 
part,” not to the sale of a finished product such as the Model 640 
Shear. Moreover, Justice Stevens’s reference to Asahi’s “regular 
course of dealing” does not introduce an additional element to his 
standard but merely (and obviously) describes a sufficient basis for 
establishing purposeful availment over Asahi. Breyer, however, 
invites the reader to treat the regular-course-of-dealing reference as 
imposing a necessary condition on the exercise of jurisdiction. This 
is a common LSAT error—mistaking a sufficient condition for a 
necessary one—and provides no grounds from which to conclude 
that Stevens endorsed or even suggested anything like a single-sale-
insufficiency standard. 
* * * 
If we add up the nine votes of the Asahi plurality and concurring 
opinions (four-four-one), and toss in the seven-person majority 
opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen, we arrive at a big zero for 
Justice Breyer’s proposed single-sale-insufficiency inference. That 
inference is either wholly illogical from the perspective of what the 
opinions he relies on actually said, or, to the extent the inference 
rests on logic, it flows from reconstructed and recalibrated versions 
of those opinions. Keep in mind that this is the inference that makes 
the case go away. Thus, Justice Breyer runs his “primary facts” 
through the funnel of his ersatz inference and (surprise, surprise) 
readily concludes that jurisdiction cannot be sustained under the 
present state of the law. In the concurrence’s words, “Accordingly, 
on the record present here, resolving this case requires no more than 
adhering to our precedents.”139 Yes, but only if adhering to 
precedents means revising those precedents to fit the conclusion. 
One cannot have confidence in a conclusion derived from such a 
factually abstract and intellectually flawed reasoning process. Yet, 
while a mistaken path can sometimes lead to the correct destination, I 
do not think that is the case here. Although it is not my purpose to 
demonstrate that the Court (or the plurality or concurrence) arrived at 
an incorrect result, it is instructive to consider how easy it is to 
demonstrate that the stream-of-commerce doctrine, as it stood prior 
to J. McIntyre, would support a finding of jurisdiction. Taking 
Justice O’Connor as our guide—on the assumption that her stream-
 
 139. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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of-commerce standard is the strictest of the three Asahi standards—
one can reasonably argue that her something-more standard has been 
met. Unlike Asahi, a relatively passive component part manufacturer 
that didn’t market its products in the United States and that didn’t 
employ the distribution system that took its valve from Taiwan to 
California, McIntyre UK actively marketed its product in the United 
States and did, in fact, choose (“create, control, or employ”140) the 
exact distribution system that brought its machine predictably and 
not fortuitously to New Jersey. If this argument is wrong, it was 
Justice Breyer’s burden to explain why that is so. His abstraction of 
the facts and his seeming ignorance of doctrine allows him to duck 
that responsibility under the pretense of stare decisis. 
2.  An Absence of “Modern Concerns” 
Part II of Justice Breyer’s concurrence does three things. First, it 
expresses disagreement with Justice Kennedy’s “submission” or 
target standard, a standard that the concurrence describes as a “strict 
no-jurisdiction rule.”141 That disagreement, coupled with Justice 
Ginsburg’s implicit rejection of the Kennedy standard in her three-
person dissent, translates into a five-person majority disfavoring the 
target standard. Hence, although we don’t know exactly what the 
target standard is, we do know that a majority of the Court disfavors 
it. We should be thankful for this morsel of clarity. 
Second, the concurrence rejects what Justice Breyer 
characterizes as the “absolute approach adopted by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court . . . .”142 But neither the New Jersey Supreme Court 
nor the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court used 
the word “absolute” or any derivation of that word. Both state courts 
ultimately premised their decisions on a detailed discussion of the 
facts connecting McIntyre UK to the marketing and sale of the 
Model 640 Shear that was sold to Curcio Scrap Metal in New Jersey. 
Justice Breyer premises his absolutist case against the New 
Jersey Supreme Court on what seems to be a calculated misreading 
(or a casually sloppy reading) of the state court’s opinion. As Breyer 
tells it, the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold a manufacturer 
“subject to jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it 
 
 140. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality opinion). 
 141. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 142. Id. 
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‘knows or reasonably should know that its products are distributed 
through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those 
products being sold in any of the fifty states.’”143 That’s Justice 
Breyer’s emphasis. He’s right. “Might” is a thin reed from which to 
hang the assertion of jurisdiction, but the New Jersey Supreme Court 
did no such thing. Justice Breyer simply deletes the second half of 
the above quoted sentence (without ellipses). Here’s what the New 
Jersey Supreme Court actually said: 
A manufacturer that knows or reasonably should know that 
its products are distributed through a nationwide 
distribution system that might lead to those products being 
sold in any of the fifty states must expect that it will be 
subject to this State’s jurisdiction if one of its defective 
products is sold to a New Jersey consumer, causing 
injury.144 
In other words, the premise of the state court’s standard was not 
on a possible sale under a national marketing scheme but on an 
actual sale in a state within that marketing scheme’s targeted range. 
This may or may not be an acceptable standard, but it isn’t premised 
on the word “might.” It is premised on the calculated success of the 
marketing scheme, as the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in 
some detail.145 
Interestingly enough, Justice Breyer’s worries over the 
consequences of adopting an absolutist rule underscore the 
deficiency of his own opinion: 
What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer 
which specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized 
distributor to sell its product in a distant State might seem 
unfair in the case of a small manufacturer (say, an 
Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and 
saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a 
single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State 
(Hawaii).146 
 
 143. Id. (quoting Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 592 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)). 
 144. Nicastro II, 987 A.2d at 592 (emphasis added). 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77. 
 146. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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This faux concern for an imaginary potter encapsulates the 
critical flaw in the concurrence, namely, a complete failure to 
confront the actual case (facts and law) pending before the Court. 
J. McIntyre was not about an Appalachian potter who makes and 
peddles consumer products through a large distributor over which the 
potter has no apparent control. It was about a well-established 
manufacturer of expensive three-ton industrial machines used in the 
processing of scrap metal; it was about a manufacturer that directly 
employed and participated in a marketing and distribution system 
with the express goal of exploiting the entire U.S. market; it was 
about a manufacturer that didn’t sit at a potter’s wheel hoping for a 
sale somewhere in America but that traveled on an annual basis to 
the largest and most relevant marketing conventions held in cities 
throughout the United States and that brought its machines there for 
display and hawked those machines from booths it shared with its 
exclusive U.S. distributor. If one were to conclude that jurisdiction 
could be exercised over this manufacturer in those states in which its 
marketing scheme met with success, it would not be difficult to 
distinguish the case of the “wistful potter.” In any event, let’s worry 
about the aggressive manufacturer and marketer actually before the 
Court and not about the potter who may (but likely never will) be 
asked to defend an injury caused by one of his or her coffee mugs in 
Hawaii.147 (Actually, the idea of a retailer in Hawaii selling 
Appalachian coffee mugs is pretty amusing. I guess that’s the type of 
thing you come up with at tea time.) 
Finally, and in partial explanation for his reluctance to adopt 
“new” jurisdictional rules in this case, Justice Breyer asserts that 
Nicastro’s lawsuit presented “an unsuitable vehicle for making broad 
pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules.”148 I believe 
that I’ve demonstrated that there was no need to “refashion” 
jurisdictional rules to sustain jurisdiction in this case. But even if 
some refashioning were required, the premise of the statement is 
unsound. Breyer’s point is that the modern phenomenon of Web 
 
 147. To be fair to Justice Breyer, he extends his worries beyond Appalachia to Egyptian shirt 
makers, Brazilian manufacturing cooperatives, and Kenyan coffee farmers. Id. at 2794. He 
worries about them every bit as much as he worries about the potter and the manufacturer of 
industrial machines. I do note, however, that all of his worries are directed toward potential 
defendants with no parallel concern for the consumers who may be injured by the products sold 
into the U.S. market by his imaginary defendants. 
 148. Id. at 2792–93. 
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marketing presents the Court with jurisdictional challenges quite 
unlike those that arise in quotidian cases such as this one. Apropos of 
this concern, he observes: 
But what do those standards mean when a company targets 
the world by selling products from its Web site? And does it 
matter if, instead of shipping the products directly, a 
company consigns the products through an intermediary 
(say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the 
orders? And what if the company markets its products 
through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed 
in a forum? Those issues have serious commercial 
consequences but are totally absent in this case.149 
Implicit in these observations is that Web marketing differs in 
some jurisdictionally relevant fashion from non-Web marketing. But 
is that true? Justice Breyer references an imaginary company that 
targets the world through its website. He does not explain how that 
type of targeting differs in any jurisdictionally significant fashion 
from a worldwide marketing scheme that uses non-Web media or 
practices to sell its products. For example, there is no doubt that 
McIntyre UK targeted the entire U.S. market. If, instead of a 
convention-based marketing scheme, McIntyre UK had used the 
Web to sell its machines, would the national e-targeting, accessible 
in New Jersey, have altered the jurisdictional outcome? Should it? 
On what sensible grounds? Would a popup ad appearing on a New 
Jersey-accessible website cross the line between unilateral contact 
and purposeful contact? Again, Justice Breyer’s conceptual worries 
over abstract cases not before the Court leads him to misunderstand 
and undervalue the actual case before the Court. He doesn’t seem to 
know that he’s comparing apples to apples.150 
Here’s where we end up: tea and biscuits served with a 
superficial chat about everything except those things that actually 
matter—the factual and doctrinal details most pertinent to resolving 
the pending case. Personally, I’ve had my fill of tea. 
 
 149. Id. at 2793. 
 150. In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010), Justice Breyer, writing for a 
unanimous Court, adopted a more circumspect approach to cyberspace concerns not before the 
Court. In that case, he endorsed a generally applicable standard for measuring a corporation’s 
principal place of business, while leaving open the question of how that standard might be applied 
in the commercial arrangements of cyberspace. Id. at 1194–95. It is not clear why that sensible 
and circumspect approach was not available to him in J. McIntyre. 
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C.  The Dissent 
The dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan, begins with a dramatic and slightly 
Kafkaesque narrative in which an anonymous “foreign industrialist” 
simultaneously seeks to develop a market in the United States and 
avoid liability in those places in which its marketing succeeds.151 
After providing a few details describing the industrialist’s game plan, 
the dissent asks, “Has [the industrialist] succeeded in escaping 
personal jurisdiction in a State where one of its products is sold and 
causes injury or even death to a local user?”152 The reader wants to 
say, “Of course not!” But alas, dear reader, the dissent informs, 
although the law agrees with you, a “splintered majority” of the 
Court does not.153 Rather, that majority has “turn[ed] the clock back” 
to a “Pilate-like” jurisprudence under which the foreign industrialist 
may wash its hands of the matter.154 
Then a jump cut to the facts: “On October 11, 2001, a three-ton 
metal shearing machine severed four fingers on Robert Nicastro’s 
right hand.”155 By starting with this stark and highly personalized 
detail, one that both the plurality and the concurrence ignore, Justice 
Ginsburg announces an alternative perspective from which to view 
the case, one that is less worried about abstractions or imaginary 
defendants and more concerned with the pending case’s realities. She 
continues that reality-driven theme with a thorough and detailed 
description of the facts, gathering information from the lower court 
opinions, the joint appendix, and, to a small extent, materials beyond 
the record.156 She ends the narrative with a charged summation: 
In sum, McIntyre UK’s regular attendance and 
exhibitions at ISRI conventions was surely a purposeful 
step to reach customers for its products “anywhere in the 
United States.” At least as purposeful was McIntyre UK’s 
 
 151. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 2795. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2795–97. For a similarly detailed description of the facts, see supra text 
accompanying notes 5–33. See also Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. 
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (describing the facts of the case); 
Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010), 
rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (describing the facts 
of the case). 
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engagement of McIntyre America as the conduit for sales of 
McIntyre UK’s machines to buyers “throughout the United 
States.” Given McIntyre UK’s endeavors to reach and profit 
from the United States market as a whole, Nicastro’s suit, I 
would hold, has been brought in a forum entirely 
appropriate for the adjudication of his claim. He alleges that 
McIntyre UK’s shear machine was defectively designed or 
manufactured and, as a result, caused injury to him at his 
workplace. The machine arrived in Nicastro’s New Jersey 
workplace not randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of 
the U.S. connections and distribution system that McIntyre 
UK deliberately arranged.157 
And thus the dissent sets the stage for a careful application of 
the law as it stood prior to the retrograde transgressions of the 
“splintered majority.”158 Now that’s just the ticket. 
After disposing of a few preliminary points, Justice Ginsburg 
describes the premise of her jurisdictional assessment as follows: 
The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations 
and other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, 
gave prime place to reason and fairness. Is it not fair and 
reasonable, given the mode of trading of which this case is 
an example, to require the international seller to defend at 
the place its products cause injury? Do not litigational 
convenience and choice-of-law considerations point in that 
direction? On what measure of reason and fairness can it be 
considered undue to require McIntyre UK to defend in New 
Jersey as an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its 
industrial machines anywhere and everywhere in the United 
States? Is not the burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New 
Jersey fair, i.e., a reasonable cost of transacting business 
internationally, in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to 
go to Nottingham, England to gain recompense for an injury 
 
 157. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In her description of the facts, 
Justice Ginsburg notes that as of 2008, New Jersey was by far the largest processor of scrap metal 
in the United States. Id. at 2795. This fact, however, post-dates the events relevant to this case 
and is not part of the record. I agree with Justice Breyer that such facts should not be a factor in 
the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). This fact does not reappear in 
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisdictional analysis. 
 158. Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The adjective “splintered” is evocative. It suggests 
the chaos of scattered splinters and the crippling fragility of having to wear a splint. 
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he sustained using McIntyre’s product at his workplace in 
Saddle Brook, New Jersey?159 
What? Something has gone awry. The dissent opens with a 
volley condemning the plurality and concurrence for “turn[ing] the 
clock back” to achieve a result “[i]nconceivable” under the regime of 
International Shoe.160 But instead of applying the standards of that 
regime, Justice Ginsburg revs the clock to fast-forward toward a new 
and more highly evolved standard that she later describes as 
representing the “full growth” of jurisdictional doctrine.161 
And to where do Justice Ginsburg’s rhetorical questions lead? 
Clearly, one could answer each of them with the anticipated response 
(yes, yes, none, yes) and still fall short of establishing jurisdiction 
under the “modern approach to jurisdiction . . . ushered in by 
International Shoe.”162 For while International Shoe may have given 
“prime place to reason and fairness,”163 that “prime place” was 
constructed from precedents, and each of those precedents involved 
purposeful activity in or directed toward the forum state.164 Indeed, 
under the regime of International Shoe, it is the fact of purposeful 
contact with the forum that sustains the presumption of reason and 
fairness by providing the defendant with a fair warning of a potential 
lawsuit in the forum. And even if International Shoe itself did not 
make the interlocking nature of purposeful contacts and the 
presumption of reasonableness clear, cases following it did.165 More 
to the point, the Court has been unwavering in its rejection of the 
center of gravity or choice of law alternatives to purposeful 
direction.166 In Hanson v. Denckla, for example, the Court 
specifically held that a state “does not acquire [personal] jurisdiction 
by being the ‘center of gravity’ of the controversy, or the most 
 
 159. Id. at 2800–01. 
 160. Id. at 2795. 
 161. Id. at 2804. 
 162. Id. at 2800. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–19 (1945) (citing cases). 
 165. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (holding that “the 
constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum 
contacts’ in the forum state”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (holding minimum 
contacts with the forum state to be a “prerequisite to the exercise of power” over a nonresident 
defendant). 
 166. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) 
(rejecting convenience as the touchstone of due process); Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253–54 (rejecting 
“center of gravity” and “choice of law” alternatives to minimum contacts). 
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convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, 
not choice of law.”167 
There is nothing inherently wrong with the center-of-gravity 
approach. Among other benefits, it simplifies the jurisdictional 
inquiry by eliminating artificial complexities pertaining to 
purposefulness and by focusing a court’s attention on the 
fundamental due process questions of reasonableness and fairness. 
And from an academic point of view, Justice Ginsburg writes a 
delightfully intellectual opinion. I do question, however, the tactical 
choice of abandoning a more prosaic resolution if only as prelude to 
her grander themes. Certainly, her invitation to adopt a convenience 
model as an opening gambit is not likely (predictably not likely) to 
attract a majority of the current Court, and, unfortunately, the 
invitation’s prominent placement in her opinion validates the 
concurrence’s claim that only a change in the law could sustain 
jurisdiction in this case. Thus, by relying exclusively on a giant leap 
forward, Justice Ginsburg plays an active role in the Court’s giant 
leap backward. 
This poor tactical choice is doubly vexing since Justice 
Ginsburg quite clearly does not think that jurisdiction is D.O.A. 
under the standard minimum contacts test. Tucked into her effort to 
press the arc of the law to its full-growth potential, Justice Ginsburg 
offers a glimpse of the more prosaic, minimum-contacts resolution of 
Nicastro’s case: 
McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote 
and sell its machines in the United States, “purposefully 
availed itself “ of the United States market nationwide, not 
a market in a single State or a discrete collection of States. 
McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the market of all 
States in which its products were sold by its exclusive 
distributor. “Th[e] ‘purposeful availment’ requirement,” 
this Court has explained, simply “ensures that a defendant 
will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 
‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.”168 
 
 167. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254. 
 168. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). 
  
Winter 2012] FOREWORD 385 
The emphasized sentence encapsulates the very essence of this 
case: a nationwide marketing plan that leads to jurisdiction in those 
states in which the plan succeeds. The essential question implicit in 
these facts is whether success in the state constitutes purposeful 
availment of that state. Justice Ginsburg never addresses that 
question. Instead she offers more rhetorical questions. First this: “If 
McIntyre UK is answerable in the United States at all, is it not 
‘perfectly appropriate to permit the exercise of that jurisdiction . . . at 
the place of injury’?”169 And then this: “How could McIntyre UK not 
have intended, by its actions targeting a national market, to sell 
products in the fourth largest destination for imports among all States 
of the United States and the largest scrap metal market?”170 And 
finally she finds solace in two lower court opinions that have upheld 
jurisdiction under such circumstances, describing the rationale of 
those cases as premised on “fundamental fairness.”171 However, both 
cited decisions premised the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign 
manufacturer on a fact-specific satisfaction of Justice O’Connor’s 
something-more standard,172 not on an open-ended reason-and-
fairness standard. 
In an apparent response to the plurality and concurring opinions, 
the dissent provides an accurate and capable description of World-
Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, the point being to demonstrate that 
neither of these decisions controlled the pending case’s outcome. 
Toward the end of that discussion, the dissent distinguishes between 
the component part manufacturer in Asahi, which did not seek out 
customers in the U.S. market or control distribution to that market, 
and McIntyre UK, which clearly did both. From this the dissent 
concludes, “To hold that Asahi controls this case would, to put it 
bluntly, be dead wrong.”173 Of course, this statement is dead wrong. 
The correct statement would be, “To hold that Asahi precludes the 
exercise of jurisdiction in this case would, to put it bluntly, be dead 
wrong.” Why? Because given the distinction drawn by the dissent, it 
appears quite likely that Justice O’Connor’s something-more 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion also includes an Appendix of lower court opinions 
favorable to the exercise of jurisdiction under similar circumstances. Id. at 2804–06. 
 172. Toben v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 543–44 (6th Cir. 1993); A. Uberti & 
C. v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1361–62 (Ariz. 1995). 
 173. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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standard has been satisfied here. Instead of making that affirmative 
point, the dissent’s otherwise intelligent discussion of World-Wide 
Volkswagen and Asahi skids to a halt at an analytical dead end. 
In short, the dissent starts in a scrap metal yard and winds up in 
the faculty lounge. High-minded, but shortsighted. And what of 
Nicastro’s severed fingers? Well, isn’t that a shame. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
If we assume that the role of the judiciary is to decide cases 
based on a fair assessment of the facts and applicable law, it would 
be difficult to conclude anything other than that the J. McIntyre 
Court utterly failed at this task. I have detailed the lack of care and 
judgment reflected in each of the separate opinions. The resulting 
confusion emanating from the Court’s collective failure to articulate 
a coherent standard should also be self-evident. But perhaps even 
more disappointing than either of the foregoing is the fact that not a 
single Justice on the Court offers a factually sound or well-reasoned 
alternative to the respective opinions of Justices Kennedy, Breyer, 
and Ginsburg. To my way of thinking, the clerks let their Justices 
down, the Justices let their colleagues down, and the Court let us all 
down. 
True, J. McIntyre does not presage the end of the jurisprudential 
world. Lower courts will continue to find a way to muddle through 
the questions left open in Asahi, questions now burdened with the 
unhelpful J. McIntyre overlay. And lawyers will still find a way to 
seek compensation for victims of industrial accidents. It is also not 
the case that the current Supreme Court is uniformly dysfunctional. 
In the context of procedural law, for example, the sensible and 
clearly written opinion in Smith v. Bayer,174 decided this same term, 
stands in marked contrast to the Court’s performance in J. McIntyre. 
But neither is J. McIntyre exceptional in its display of poor judgment 
and faulty reasoning.175 No law professor would want any of the 
opinions in J. McIntyre to serve as an exemplar of acceptable legal 
analysis. Yet, two or more Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court 
endorsed each of those opinions. That is surely something to be 
 
 174. 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011). 
 175. In the context of procedural law, two recent and obvious examples of dismal reasoning 
come to mind: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and Republic of the Philippines v. 
Pimental, 553 U.S. 851 (2008). 
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reckoned with. To what extent is the lack of attention to detail in 
J. McIntyre endemic to the Supreme Court’s decision making 
process? Do the J. McIntyre opinions reflect the Court’s mode of 
reasoning in cases about which the Justices, in the end, are not much 
concerned?176 Or shall we conclude that the more competently 
executed exemplars of reasoning are just masks for a feckless 
jurisprudence of results? And try teaching J. McIntyre without 
inducing students to plummet into a pit of cynicism. Not the end of 
the world as we know it, but not a portent of good things to come 
either. 
Of course, there are cases in which there is no possibility of 
achieving a consensus or even a bare majority, due either to the 
complexity of the issues presented or to the subject matter of the 
controversy. As to the latter, the underlying politics of a case may be 
so rigidly drawn that one side of the Court simply cannot see or hear 
the other. No one rejoices in such cases, but I accept their 
inevitability. Nicastro’s case, however, surely did not fall into either 
category. It was neither doctrinally complex nor politically charged. 
True, the scope of the stream-of-commerce test was in need of 
clarification, but that clarification did not require the unwinding of a 
Gordian knot or a rigid adherence to any particular interpretive, 
political, or moral position. Instead, it required nothing more than a 
carefully considered judgment that a majority of the Court could 
endorse. That majority might have adopted Justice O’Connor’s 
something-more standard and then explained, with clear and careful 
reasoning, why that standard was or was not satisfied. A sensible 
dissent might have offered an alternative standard but, accepting the 
inevitable, could then have explained why “proper application” of 
the O’Connor standard required a result contrary to the one the 
majority achieved. Such a solution would have decided Nicastro’s 
case on its own terms while at the same time providing the kind of 
clear exposition of the law that we can rightfully expect and demand 
of the Supreme Court in its combined roles of lawmaker and law 
interpreter. 
God save the United States and this Honorable Court. 
 
 176. In such cases, perhaps the better alternative, once the Justices discover their seeming 
indifference, would be to dismiss the case on the basis that certiorari was improvidently granted, 
rather than going on to issue opinions that only muddy the waters and damage the Justices’ 
image. 
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